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A N T I - S O C I A L  B E H A V I O U R  O R D E R S  A N D  T H E  P R E S U M P T I O N  O F  I N N O C E N C E  
C L A I R E  H A M I L T O N "  
T h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  J u s t i c e ,  M i c h a e l  
M c D o w e l l ,  h a s  r e c e n t l y  p r o p o s e d  a  
n u m b e r  o f  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  t h e  
C r i m i n a l  J u s t i c e  B i l / 2 0 0 4 ,  w h i c h  w i l l  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r  t h e  B i l l  a s  i n i t i a t c d .
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T h e  a m e n d m e n t s  t r e a t ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s s u e s :  
a  p r o v t s ! O n  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
p a t i i c i p a t i o n  i n  o r g a n i s e d  c r i m i n a l  
g a n g s ;  
•  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  s e n t e n c i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  
d r u g  t r a f f i c k i n g  a n d  f i r e a r m s  
o f f e n c e s ;  
n e w  o f f e n c e s  o f  s u p p l y i n g  d r u g s  
t o  p r i s o n e r s ;  
•  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  D r u g  
O f f e n d e r s  R e g i s t e r ;  
p r o v i s i o n s  t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  
e l e c t r o n i c  t a g g i n g  o f  o f f e n d e r s ;  
a n d  
•  n e w  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a n t i -
s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r  ( A n t i - S o c i a l  
B e h a v i o u r  O r d e r s  o r  A S B O s ) .  
I f  a c c e p t e d ,  t h e s e  a m e n d m e n t s  w o u l d  
c h a n g e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  B i l l  b e y o n d  
r e c o g n i t i o n ,  e x t e n d i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f  
t h e  B i l l  f r o m  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  G a r d a  
p o w e r s  t o  m a t t e r s  a s  d i s p a r a t e  a s  
o r g a n i s e d  c r i m e ,  s e n t e n c i n g  a n d  a n t i -
s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r .  S e r i o u s  c o n c e r n s  
m u s t  b e  e x p r e s s e d  a b o u t  t h e  w a y  i n  
w h i c h  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e s  t o  t h e  B i l l  
w e r e  m a d e  a f t e r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
t h e  B i l l  t o  t h e  O i r e a c h t a s .  T h i s  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  n o t  c o n d u c i v e  t o  a  f u l l  
d e b a t e  o n  t h e  w e i g h t y  i s s u e s  o u t l i n e d  
a b o v e  a n d  r e p r e s e n t s  a  c l e a r  d e p a r t u r e  
f r o m  s t a n d a r d  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o c e s s e s .  
E N G L I S H  L A W  O N  T H E  
I S S U E  
T h i s  q u e s t i o n  w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  r e c e n t l y  
b y  t h e  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  i n  R  ( o n  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o /  J ' v f c C a n n )  v  
I r i s h  L m t ·  T i m e s  - - N o .  1 4 .  2 0 0 5  
P r o p o s a l s  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  A S B O s  
f o r m  o n e  o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  
t o  t h e  B i l l .  A n  A S B O  i s  a  c i v i l  o r d e r  
m a d e  b y  t h e  c o u r t  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
p u b l i c  f r o m  a n t i - s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r  
d e f i n e d  a s  " b e h a v i o u r  w h i c h  c a u s e s  
h a r a s s m e n t ,  a l a r m  a n d  d i s t r e s s " .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  o r d e r  i s  c i v i l  i n  n a t u r e ,  
b r e a c h  o f  a n  A S B O  d o e s  n o t  i n v o k e  
t h e  n o r m a l  c o n t e m p t  o f  c o u r t  
p r o c e d u r e  f o r  b r e a c h  o f  a  c i v i l  o r d e r ,  
b u t  i n  f a c t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  c r i m i n a l  
o f f e n c e  p u n i s h a b l e  b y  a  m a x i m u m  
p e n a l t y  o f  f i v e  y e a r s  i m p r i s o n m e n t .  
A S B O s  w e r e  f i r s t  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
E n g l a n d  i n  1 9 9 9  t h r o u g h  t h e  C r i m e  
a n d  D i s o r d e r  A c t  1 9 9 8  a n d  w e r e  
a d o p t e d  b y  t h e  L a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  
a s  a  d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i c y  c h o i c e  t o  " m i x  
t h e  b e s t  o f  t h e  c r i m i n a l  a n d  t h e  c i v i l  
l a w " "  i n  o r d e r  t o  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  
t a r g e t  a n t i - s o c i a l  b e h a v i o u r  
p e r p e t r a t e d  p r i m a r i l y  b y  y o u n g  
p e o p l e  a n d  g r o u p s  o f  y o u n g  p e o p l e .  
O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h i s  
h y b r i d  s t r u c t u r e ,  ( w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  " s a i l i n g  a s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  
w i n d  a s  p o s s i b l e ' V  w a s  t h a t  t h e  c i v i l  
r u l e s  o f  e v i d e n c e  a n d  p r o c e d u r e  
a p p l i e d  s o  t h a t  h e a r s a y  e v i d e n c e  
f r o m  f r i g h t e n e d  a n d  i n t i m i d a t e d  
p e o p l e  w i t h i n  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  c o u l d  
b e  a d d u c e d  i n  c o u r t ,  w i t h o u t  s u c h  
p e r s o n s  g i v i n g  d i r e c t  e v i d e n c e .  
A n o t h e r  b e n e f i t  c l e a r l y  i n t e n d e d  b y  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  e v i d e n c e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  c i v i l  
s t a n d a r d  o f  p r o o f ,  t h e r e b y  
c i r c u m v e n t i n g  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  
1 \ 1 a n c h e s t e r  C r m v n  C o u r t
5  
w h i c h  
r e j e c t e d  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  A S B O  
p r o c e e d i n g s  w e r e ,  i n  ' · r e a l i t y  a n d  i n  
s u b s t a n c e " ,
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c r i m i n a l ,  a l b e i t  w i t h  t h e  
c o n c e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  c r i m i n a l  s t a n d a r d  
i n n o c e n c e  a n d  i t s  c o r o l l a r y ,  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  p r o o f  b e y o n d  a l l  
r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  A s s u m i n g ,  i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  s p e d  t i c  p r o p o s a l s ,  t h a t  a  
s i m i l a r  s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  b e  a d o p t e d  b y  
t h e  M i n i s t e r ,  h a r d  q u e s t i o n s  m u s t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  b e  a s k e d  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  t h e  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  b e i n g  u s e d  a s  a  m e a n s  
o f  s u b v e r t i n g  t h e  s t r i c t u r e s  o f  t h e  
c r i m i n a l  l a w ,  i n c l u d i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l  
l e g a l  v a l u e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  
o f  i n n o c e n c e ,  a n d  i t  i s  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  
w h i c h  f o r m s  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e .  
T h e  i s s u e  i s  f a r  f r o m  a  m e r e  
a c a d e m i c  q u i b b l e .  I t  i s  s a l u t a r y  t o  n o t e  
t h a t ,  w h i l e  c o n c e r n s  i n  E n g l a n d  
o r i g i n a l l y  c e n t r e d  a r o u n d  " n e t  
w i d e n i n g "  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  
i m p r i s o n m e n t  f o r  m i n o r ,  n o n - c r i m i n a l  
b e h a v i o u r ,  s i x  y e a r s  o f  p r a c t i c e  h a s  
s h o w n  t h a t  t h e  o r d e r s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  
b e i n g  u s e d  f o r  a c t s  w h i c h  a l r e a d y  f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
c r i m i n a l  b e h a v i o u r  s u c h  a s  b u r g l a r y ,  
c r i m i n a l  d a m a g e ,  t h e f t  a n d  v a r i o u s  
f o r m s  o f  t h r e a t e n i n g  a n d  a b u s i v e .  
b e h a v i o u r .
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T h e  a r g u m e n t  b e c o m e s  
e v e n  m o r e  c o m p e l l i n g  w h e n  i t  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  d e f e n d a n t s  w i t h o u t  
t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  
i n n o c e n c e  i n  A S B O  p r o c e e d i n g s  c a n  
f a c e  p e n a l t i e s  w h i c h  a r e  m u c h  m o r e  
s e v e r e  t h a n  t h o s e  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  
i m p o s e d  i f  t h e  c o n d u c t  h a d  b e e n  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  p r o s e c u t e d  i n  t h e  
c r i m i n a l  c o u r t s .  F i v e  y e a r s  i s  a  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  t a r i f f  t h a n  c a n  b e  
i m p o s e d  i n  t h e  l o w e r  c o u r t s  f o r  t h e  
t y p e s  o f  o f f e n c e s  l i s t e d  a b o v e .  
o f  p r o o f  s h o u l d  a p p l y .  T h e  f o u r  
i s s u e s  w h i c h  f e l l  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
b y  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  w e r e :  
w h e t h e r  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  d o m e s t i c  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e e d i n g s  l e a d i n g  
Z 1 5  , l  , ( , '  
CRIMINAL 
making of an anti-social 
behaviour order were criminal in 
nature; 
• whether under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human 
Rights ("ECHR") such 
proceedings involved a "criminal 
charge"; 
• whether under s.l of the Act, 
hearsay evidence was admissible 
in proceedings seeking such an 
order; and 
• what the standard of proof was 
in such proceedings. 1 
The House held that the proceedings 
under the Crime and Disorder Act 
were civil, not criminal, both for the 
purposes of domestic and 
Convention law. This conclusion was 
based on various factors: 
proceedings were not brought by the 
Crown Prosecution Service; there 
was no formal accusation of a 
breach of the criminal law; ASBOs 
did not appear on criminal records; 
and there is no immediate imposition 
of imprisonment. In this latter regard, 
the House held that proceedings for 
breach of an order, though 
undoubtedly criminal in character, 
should be considered separately 
from the initial application. As Lord 
Steyn noted "[t]hese are separate 
and independent procedures. The 
making of the order will presumably 
sometimes serve its purposes and 
there will be no proceedings for 
breach. It is in principle necessary 
to consider the two stages 
separately."~ Perhaps most 
significantly, however, for the 
purposes of detennining compatibility 
with the Convention, the House held 
thatASBOs, unlike ordinary criminal 
penalties, are designed to prevent 
anti-social behaviour rather than to 
punish the bffender. Lord Steyn 
held that the "the true purpose of the 
proceedings is preventative .... It 
follows that the making of an anti-
social behaviour order is not a 
conviction or condemnation that the 
person is guilty of an offence. lt 
results in no penalty whatsoever."9 
Lord Hope was similarly of the view 
that "an anti-social behaviour order 
may well restrict the freedom ofthe 
defendant to do as he wants and to 
216 . 
go where he pleases. But these 
restrictions are imposed for 
preventative reasons, not as 
punishment." 10 
In light ofthe above classification 
of the proceedings as civil, it was 
held that hearsay evidence was 
admissible pursuant to the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995. In the Law 
Lords' estimation, the admission of 
such evidence is critical if 
magistrates were to be adequately 
informed of the scale of anti-social 
behaviour and the measures of 
control required. Indeed, as Lord 
Hutton noted, this has been key to 
their effectiveness: 
[T]he courts have held that 
proceedings under section I [of the 
Crime and Disorder Act1998] are civil 
proceedings and not criminal 
proceedings. Therefore it has not 
been necessary for those who allege 
that they have suffered as a result of 
anti-social behaviour on the part of 
the defendant to go into the witness 
box to give evidence against him, 
because hearsay evidence can be 
given of their complaints and 
allegations pursuant to section l of 
the Civil Evidence Act 1995. 
In relation to the standard of proof, 
it is an interesting feature of the 
judgment that the House held that it 
is the criminal standard which 
applies in ASBO proceedings. This 
standard should be met, in the 
interests of fairness, when the 
allegations of criminal or quasi-
criminal behaviour were made owing 
to the "seriousness of matters 
involved". 11 
ANALYSIS 
A superficial reading of the legislation 
supports the Law Lords' conclusion. 
Sections I - 9 of the Act contain 
many indicators of civil proceedings 
such as application by complaint, and 
none of the types of outcome that 
nonnally follow criminal proceedings 
result from the process. It is 
submitted, however, that many of the 
above elements, such as the absence 
of a formal charge and criminal 
record focus on form rather than 
substance and as such should not 
have influenced the decision of the 
Lords. Moreover, on closer 
examination, it is clear that the 
original application for an ASBO 
cannot be so conveniently separated 
from its criminal counterpart in the 
event of a contravention of the order. 
One of the main reasons for this, as 
cogently argued by McDonald, 12 is 
that findings of fact from the initial 
application may have a bearing on 
the sentence which will be ultimately 
imposed. A person sentenced for 
breach of an ASBO will be 
punished, not just for one act of 
defiance of the order, but for the 
previous anti-social acts committed 
by that person which led to the 
imposition of the order. Thus, to give 
McDonald's example, a "Rowdy 
Roger" who insists on playing his 
heavy metal music late at night and 
who is subsequently made the 
subject of an ASBO, will be 
punished, in the event ofhis breach, 
not just for one night of loud music 
in defiance of the order but for the 
effect of all the preceding nights of 
loud music. 
McDonald supports his argument 
with comments made by Labour 
spokesperson, Alun Michael, in the 
Commons Standing Committee on 
the 1998 Bill. Mr Michael was asked 
to explain the maximum five year 
term of imprisonment for breach of 
an ASBO in light of the fact that the 
maximum sentence for affray is only 
three years under the Public Order 
Act 1986. He explained that affray 
"involves one incident" whereas 
breach of an ASBO involves "a 
pattem ofbehaviour that is damaging 
people's lives over a considerable 
period oftime". 13 The fact that the 
behaviour proven at the initial hearing 
contributes towards the criminal 
penalty finally imposed would clearly 
suggest that a global approach 
should be taken to the issue of the 
characterization of the proceedings 
and would suggest that they do have 
a significant punitive element. 
Other commentators have taken 
issue with the narrow focus of the 
decision in McCann on the purpose 
of the proceedings under the 1998 
Act. Bakalis 14 notes that, "the 




House of Lords, was ... rather 
selective in the parts of the 
Strasbourg judgment it chose to 
apply" through its excessive focus 
on the preventative/punitive 
distinction. She cites two decisions 
of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Ozturk v Germanyl 5 and 
Lauko v Slovakia 1" which place 
an equal emphasis on factors such 
as the existence of a deterrent 
element, whether the offences were 
aimed at the world at large, and 
whether the aim of the proceedings 
was to stop any interference with 
the world at large. In a similar vein, 
Ashworth 17 has questioned the 
approach ofthe English courts to the 
issue and has drawn attention to the 
robust case law developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 
this area. The court has held on 
several occasions that, in order to 
prevent subversion of the procedural 
safeguards guaranteed in the fair trial 
provisions of Article 6 of the 
Convention, that the term "charged 
with a criminal offence" should be 
given an autonomous meaning that 
looks to the substance rather than 
the fonn. This is known as the ''anti-
subversion doctrine" and exists to 
prevent states simply reclassifying 
criminal proceedings as civil in order 
to avoid the protections attaching to 
defendants in criminal 
procecdings. 18 In light of this 
approach, Ashworth argues that the 
Strasbourg Court will subject the 
new ASBO hybrid to much closer 
scrutiny than that undertaken by the 
House of Lords. 19 
Ashworth contrasts the approach 
of the House of Lords in lv!cCann 
with the approach taken by the 
European Court in the leading case 
of Welch v UK. 211 In Welch, a 
confiscation order imposed upon the 
applicant subsequent to his 
conviction for drug trafficking 
offences 21 was successfully 
challenged on the basis that it 
amounted to the application of a 
retrospective criminal penalty under 
Article 7 of the Convention. The 
significance of the decision in the 
current context is its designation of 
the confiscation order as a 
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"penalty". The government's 
submission related solely to the 
purpose of the Act: which was partly 
confiscatory and partly preventative. 
The court, however, relied on a 
number of elements of the order in 
reaching its decision, such as the 
power of the court to take into 
account the defendant's culpability 
when fixing the amount of order; the 
wide ranging statutory assumptions 
about the origins of the money and 
the provision for imprisonment in 
default. 22 As Ashworth notes, 
applying the principles adumbrated 
in Welsh to the 1998 Act would 
require consideration of the open-
ended nature of the orders23 (the 
applicant in McCann, for example, 
was prohibited from entering the 
area in which he lived), as well as 
consideration of the substantial 
penalties in the event of default or 
breach. Such an analysis did not 
feature prominently in the Lord's 
decision in lvfcCann, "[the decision] 
places the emphasis on the purpose 
of the order and appears to give far 
less weight to the impact and 
consequences of the order than did 
the Strasbourg Court in FVetch. 
Purpose is important but, if the 
effects of an order are far-reaching, 
there must surely come a point at 
which they may fairly be held to 
override the purpose". 2~ 
It must also be noted that the 
judgment appears contradictory in its 
conclusion that the "seriousness of 
the matters involved" mandate a 
higher standard of proof, yet similarly 
exacting standards are not required 
in relation to admission of hearsay 
evidence. Indeed, it is a point of 
concern that the leading of hearsay 
evidence in proceedings for an 
ASBO may subvert the application 
of the criminal standard of proof as 
mandated by the House in 1VfcCann 
and deprive it of any practical effect. 
The House of Lords justified the use 
of hearsay evidence on the basis of 
the rights of the community "the 
general interest of the community ... 
represented by weak and vulnerable 
people ... [balanced against] the 
protection of the defendants' rights 
CRIMINAL 
requires the scales to come down in 
favour of the protection of the 
community and of permitting the use 
of hearsay evidence. " 25 Yet, this 
argument could equally be made in 
relation to burglary and armed 
robbery which are equally endemic 
in some deprived areas. In line with 
the House of Lords's logic, should 
not a reduced standard of proof 
apply here also?26 
This point was taken up by the 
Human Rights Commissioner 
Alvaro Gil-Robles in his recent 
report on his visit to the UK: "for 
my part, I find the combination of a 
criminal burden of proof with civil 
rules of evidence rather hard to 
square; hearsay evidence and the 
testimony of police officers or 
'professional witnesses' do not seem 
to me to be capable of proving 
alleged behaviour beyond 
reasonable doubt."27 Significantly, 
he further notes that the use of 
professional witnesses and hearsay 
evidence (and, therefore, the poorest 
quality evidence) is unduly 
encouraged in the Home Office 
Guidelines on ASBOs. Even 
commentators more disposed to the 
ASBO concede that "with the right 
evidence, an application based solely 
on hearsay may well succeed."2s 
The Commissioner's argument 
would appear to be borne out by 
statistics which show an 
overwhelming success rate for 
authorities in obtaining ASBOs. Of 
the 2,035 ASBO applications notified 
to the Home Office up to June 30, 
2004, only 42 applications were 
refused, which constitutes a success 
rate of 98 per cent. 29 As observed 
by one commentator, ''this suggests 
that the added protection of a higher 
standard of proof ... [has] not made 
any practical difference to the 
control of the state over the 
individual's freedom." 10 
THE COMPATIBILITY OF 
THE ASBO WITH IRISH LAW 
It is not yet known what form the 
legislation making provision for 
ASBOs in Irish law will take and it 
is difticult to determine compatibility 
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in a vacuum. McCann may 
certainly prove persuasive should 
issues arise in relation to the 
compatibility of the legislation with 
Article 6 of the ECHR 31 subject, of 
course, to a ruling by the European 
Court of Human Rights on the 
issue. 32 
It remains to consider the 
constitutionality of the legislation in 
the light of Article 38.1 which 
enshrines certain procedural 
protections, among them the 
presumption of innocence, for 
persons charged with a criminal 
offence. Should the courts find that 
the legislative provisions introduced 
by the Minister were, in reality, 
criminal and the necessary 
safeguards had, therefore, been 
avoided, they would be struck down 
as unconstitutional. Key to such a 
detennination is the issue of whether 
the courts will consider the initial 
application for an ASBO as capable 
of separation from the later 
proceedings for breach. Despite the 
reasoning of their Lordships in 
McCann, there are compelling 
reasons for finding that they are 
inextricably linked: the initial hearing 
defines the scope of the order and 
therefore, detennines the extent of 
the defendant's criminal liability, 
indeed, it is impossible to defend 
proceedings for breach without 
harking back to the terms of the 
original order. As argued by Prof. 
William Binchy at a recent 
conference on ASBOs: 
... this rigorous segregation between 
the two stages of the ASBO process 
is less than convincing. There is an 
integration between each stage: the 
civil element is a necessary 
precondition of the criminal element: 
it defines the outer limits - and indeed 
may well define the full scope - ofthe 
conduct that can constitute a crime. 
There may turn out to be further 
interconnections, such as placing the 
onus on a defendant accused of 
breach to show that any breach was 
based on "just cause or reasonable 
excuse'' 33 
lt must be said, however, that cause 
for optimism that the courts will 
218 
adopt an approach of "substance 
over form" would not be derived 
from a brief survey of the Irish case 
law on the characterisation of 
proceedings as civil or criminal. 
Particularly instructive in this regard 
is the decision of the High Court in 
Gilligan v Criminal Assets 
Bureau 34 which concerned a 
constitutional challenge to the novel 
civil asset forfeiture legislation 
introduced into Irish law by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. The 
principal argument advanced on 
behalf of the appellants in this court 
was that the provisions of the 1 996 
Act essentially formed part of the 
criminal law and not of the civil law 
and that the persons affected by 
those provisions were deprived of 
some of the most important 
safeguards which were historically 
a feature of the criminal law. 
Specifically, the presumption of 
innocence was reversed, the 
standard of proof was on the balance 
of probabilities rather than beyond 
reasonable doubt, and there was no 
provision for a trial by jury in respect 
of any ofthe issues. The High Court 
held that since the confiscation 
procedure introduced under the 1996 
Act was labelled and operated as a 
civil process, it did not have "all the 
features of a criminal prosecution" 
and so Article 38.1 did not apply. This 
decision was followed by O'Higgins 
J. in MF Mwphy v Glf' and both 
these decisions were upheld by the 
Supreme Court in a joint appea\.36 
Like the High Court, the Supreme 
Court focused on the trappings of 
criminal procedure and held that the 
indicia that rendered proceedings 
criminal in character- the provision 
for the detention of the person 
concerned, the bringing of him in 
custody to a Garda station, the 
searching of the person detained, his 
admission to bail, the imposition of a 
pecuniary penalty with liability to 
imprisonment in default, the 
reference in the statute to a party 
having been "convicted of an 
offence" and the provision for the 
withdrawal of proceedings by the 
entry of a nolle prosequi - were 
conspicuously absent in the 1 996 
Act. The narrow interpretation of 
"criminal" adopted in these 
decisions, focusing on the labels and 
procedures of the procedure itself, 
is redolent of the House of Lord's 
approach in McCann, and would 
suggest that the hybrid structure of 
which ASBOs are comprised may 
well pass the constitutional litmus 
test. 37 
CONCLUSION 
While concerns surrounding anti-
social behaviour are not to be 
minimised, there are more effective 
means of meeting this social 
problem 3s which address the 
underlying causes of the behaviour39 
and which do not seek to undermine 
fundamental values such as the 
presumption of imKJcence and the 
criminal standard of proof. It is 
perhaps symptomatic of the casual 
attitude towards these core legal 
concepts in England~0 that the 1998 
Act was silent as to the standard of 
proof required to obtain an ASBO 
and indeed, that effective judicial 
legislation by the House of Lords 
was required to resolve the issue.~ 1 
This is an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs in relation to such a 
fundamental aspect of criminal 
procedure and is a salutary lesson 
in light of their imminent arrival in 
this jurisdiction. ASBOs raise 
important questions about the role of 
fundamental safeguards in 
protecting persons accused of 
substantive wrongdoing. Should the 
Irish courts, in line with their English 
counterparts, sanction the use of 
such criminal-civil hybrids, the 
government will in effect be given 
carte blanche to circumvent core 
protections such as the presumption 
of innocence. Civil forfeiture 
procedures arguably already detract 
from the integrity ofthe criminal law 
in this regard. The introduction of 
ASBOs must lead one to questinn. 
as Ashworth has done in England, 
whether the criminal law really is a 
lost cause. 42 
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